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ANALYZING UNCONSCIONABILITY PROBLEMS
JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR.t
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows courts to
refuse to enforce unconscionable clauses and contracts. Although an
analogous doctrine was known at common law, it was not extensively
used. Since the UCC provision was proposed, however, the doctrine
of unconscionability has become fashionable as an all-purpose weapon
against contract problems, both within and without the Code. The
primary problem with this all-purpose weapon is that the concept of
unconscionability is vague, so that neither courts, practicing attorneys,
nor contract draftsmen can be certain of its applicability in any par-
ticular situation.
Before examining the concept of unconscionability, it is necessary
to discuss its desirability, in order to illustrate the major problems that
the doctrine attempts to solve and the primary conceptual pitfalls that
the doctrine must avoid if it is to be useful. Only then can the content
of the doctrine be examined. This article develops an analytical
structure from the evolution of section 2-302 and from the cases
decided after its promulgation. First, a conceptual framework is de-
rived from the drafting history, draftsman's comments, Official Com-
ments, and traditional equity and common law cases on the subject.
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Second, the holdings of recent cases are used to test, illustrate and
expand this conceptual framework.
The structure focuses on two types of abuses, one relating to the
contract formation process and the other to the substantive terms of
the contract; usually both types of abuses must be present to produce
a finding of unconscionability. Contract formation abuses may consist
either in deception or in refusals to bargain over contract terms.
The abuses concerning substantive contract terms are more im-
portant and more difficult to categorize. The primary type of abuse
focuses on the public interests involved in protecting the integrity of
the bargaining process, and weighs the contravention of any such
interest against the legitimate interests of the drafting party in the
rights asserted. Analysis of this type of abuse under section 2-302
is analogous to the courts' traditional approach in voiding contracts
or clauses as contrary to "public policy," but a balancing of interests is
now possible. A second type of abuse concerns boilerplate clauses that
conflict with the fundamental duties imposed on the drafting party by
the transaction. As with express warranties, these fundamental duties
may not be disclaimed, even upon notice to the non-drafting party. A
third abuse concerns fine-print clauses that undermine the reasonable
expectations of the non-drafting party. Major rights of the non-
drafting party are not waived merely because he has signed a form, and
the courts view supposed manifestations of assent more realistically in
the modern form contract transaction. A fourth category of abuse is
price disparity, which may be regarded either as merely another in-
equitable factor to be considered with all the other circumstances of
the case, or as sufficient in itself to require equitable relief.
This article does not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the
unconscionability doctrine as a tool for policing the consumer market-
place or reforming standard contracts. Such an evaluation is needed,
especially in comparison to the effectiveness of the proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit Code in accomplishing the same task. However, any
such evaluation must be based on an explicit analytical structure, and
it is hoped that the structure developed here will serve as a starting
point for evaluation of the unconscionability device.
As a starting point, this article emphasizes the derivation of its
own analysis, rather than its differences with others. Although the
arguments presented may in part rebut theories hostile to the uncon-
scionability doctrine, the article seeks to say more than "they are
wrong." Thus direct attacks on such theories are usually relegated
to footnotes.1
'See notes 50, 54, 81 & 151 infra. See also text accompanying notes 114-15 &
133-36 infra.
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I. Is THE DOCTRINE DESIRABLE?
The unconscionability doctrine is expressly incorporated into the
UCC, except in California and North Carolina, and is therefore part
of the statutory law of forty-seven states.' Nevertheless, some people
still have serious doubts about its propriety,3 and any advocate of the
doctrine must be able to argue not only that it is part of the law, but
also that it is a desirable part and its use should be promoted. The
attitude of the judiciary and the bar will determine whether the doc-
trine is used or ignored. Moreover, an examination of the underlying
reasons for the doctrine will shed light on its meaning and range of
application.
The pressure for the use of the unconscionability concept springs
primarily from the inflexibility of our inherited contract doctrines.
The results of this inflexibility can most easily be seen in the modern
consumer sale transaction.' The consumer signs a contract (usually
a form prepared by the merchant or lender), thereby supposedly mani-
festing an intent to be bound by all its terms. Of course, in practice
the buyer has not read the terms and usually could neither understand
nor change them even if he had.5 His only actual intent is a very
general one to buy or borrow rather than abstain from buying or
borrowing. There is no actual intent relating to the specific clauses
in the form's fine print, but problems relating to specific clauses do
arise, and they must be resolved by courts. The traditional incantation
by the court is that the consumer is bound by what he signed, and the
printed clauses control. This doctrine violates the consumer's ex-
pectations to the extent that it does not represent his understanding
of the contract terms. Historically, it seems that when contract law
did not protect the expectations of a significant segment of the public,
there was agitation for change. The record of such agitation extends
2 CCH INST. CREDIT GuIDE ff 650, at 4451; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302
[hereinafter cited as UCC] ; CAI. COMM. CODE § 2302 (West 1964) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-2-302 (1965). Note, however, that California does have a statutory provision
for the denial of specific performance where factors analogous to unconscionability
exist in the contract. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3391 (West 1954).
3 See Leff, Uiconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Note, Unconscionable Business Contracts: A Doctrine
Gone Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453 (1961); Comment, Policing Contracts Under the
Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 146 (1950-51).
4 See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704 (1931).
5 See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLumT. L. REV.
1072 (1953); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUTM. L. REv. 629 (1943) ; Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion
Contracts, 14 IN-T'L & ComP. L. Q. 172 (1965).
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at least from the introduction of quasi-contractual concepts to the
present truth-in-lending legislation.'
Courts have not been insensitive to agitation for change of tradi-
tional contract doctrine in situations involving violations of consumers'
expectations. Unconscionable contracts and clauses have been sur-
reptitiously invalidated for decades.7 But surreptitious invalidation
created problems. The courts did not usually invalidate on the express
ground that a particular clause or contract was unconscionable. Their
regard for "freedom of contract" prevented such a straightforward ap-
proach or any explicit recognition of judicial control over the terms
of a bargain. Instead, the courts resorted to various formal, technical
devices to achieve their ends. Although the results in the particular
case may have been desirable, the technical devices used to achieve them
were stretched, misconstrued, and otherwise abused. Courts used lack
of mutuality,' failure of consideration,9 and construction of contract
terms 10 to achieve desired results in situations where they would not
traditionally have been used.
If the application of misused technical devices and unusual con-
struction methods could have been limited to the unconscionable con-
tract situation, no particular problems would have been created. How-
ever, the language of the decisions did not mention unconscionability,
thereby purporting to be of general application, and the doctrines
enunciated were supposedly applicable to all contracts. Of course, in-
discriminate application of the doctrines was extremely unsettling and
caused great difficulty in predicting the courts' handling of normal,
fairly drafted contracts.'
The limited attack on unconscionable clauses through these devices
also encouraged contract draftsman to try again with "clearer" lan-
guage. The clearer language was always longer, more technical, and
harder for the non-drafting party to understand. A vicious cycle was
0 For treatment of quasi-contractual concepts see 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRAcTS § 19
(1963); Ames, The History of Assimpsit, 2 H.xv. L. REv. 1, 63-69 (1888).
Examples of present legislation are: Pub. L. No. 90-321 (May 29, 1968) ; MASS.
Gm. LAWS ANN., ch. 255D, §§ 9, 23 (Supp. 1967); UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE, art. 2 pt. 3, art. 3 pt 3 [hereinafter cited as U3C].
7 E.g., Hardy v. GMAC, 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928) ; Wood, Stubbs &
Co. v. Kaufmann, 233 Ill. App. 138 (1924) ; New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears,
194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922); Austin Co. v. Tillman Co., 104 Ore. 541, 209
P. 131 (1922) ; Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah
414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937).
8 E.g., American Agric. Chem. Co. v. Kennedy & Crawford, 103 Va. 171, 48 S.E.
868 (1904); Nicholls v. Wetmore, 174 Iowa 132, 156 N.W. 319 (1916); see 1-lA
A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 128, at 551 n.94, §§ 152-170 (1963).
9 E.g., Austin Co. v. Tillman Co., 104 Ore. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922).
10 E.g., Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., [1934] 1 KB. 17 (C.A. 1933); Whole-
sale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937); see
Llewellyn, supra note 4; Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. Rzv. 700 (1939).
3l See Llewellyn, mtpra note 4.
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begun. The draftsman's first try was capable of some form of mis-
construction, and the court with perfectly good intention would so mis-
construe it. The draftsman would then try again, and, if necessary,
again, each new form being more incomprehensible to the layman, but
more technically impervious to misconstruction. If the form eventually
succeeded in becoming technically impervious to misconstruction, it
would probably be totally incomprehensible as well, especially to any
layman. In effect, with the best of intentions, the court had completely
thwarted the non-drafting party's expectations.
The Code at least eliminates pressure on a court to resort to mis-
construction or other misuse of technical devices to reach a desired
result. The court may now attack the unconscionable features of a
contract directly.' The overreaching, technically impervious, but prac-
tically incomprehensible clause should no longer be the ultimate quest
of the draftsman. Even an incomprehensible clause that is not neces-
sarily overreaching may now be a liability under the Code, since the
non-drafting party cannot understand it. It would seem wise for the
draftsman to concentrate on presenting clauses in clear, understandable
language.
What can the unconscionability doctrine accomplish? First, it
can help transform traditional notions of "freedom of contract." The
common law has always limited the meaning of "freedom of contract"
that allows only the choice between entering into a particular contract
or abstaining, so that when one party has chosen to contract the other
is absolutely "free" to impose any terms. Legislatures have limited
possible contract terms, such as through usury statutes; 13 and courts
have also imposed limitations, on their own authority and without
legislation: for example, through decisions voiding liquidated damage
clauses as penalties. 4 But the unconscionability doctrine can strengthen
the concept of "freedom of contract" that implies the ability to co-
'2This does not, however, necessarily eliminate the problems caused by past deci-
sions involving misconstruction.
MlR POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 186-87, 198-99 (1921). The
doctrine of usury can be traced prior to biblical times. The Roman Law of the
Twelve Tables, the first codification of existing Roman laws and customs, permitted
the taking of interest Within the maximum legal rate of one-twelfth part of the capital.
T. DIVINE, INTEREST, AN HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL STUDY IN EcoNoMICS AND
MODERN ETHICS 5-11, 19-20 (1959) ; Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange
in French and Gernm Law, 11 TUL. L. Rxv. 345 (1937), 12 TUL. L. REv. 42 n.114
(1937). A prohibition of interest in any form was incorporated into an early English
statute. 11 Hen. VIII, c. 8 (1494). In 1545 interest was legalized by statute in
England and the maximum rate was set at 10%. Usury Act, 37 Hen. VIII, c. 9, § III
(1545). Later, the maximum legal rate was lowered to 5%. 12 Anne, Stat. 2, c. 16
(1713). This latter statute was the forerunner of modern American statutes. E.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-1 (1963). See Berger, Usury in Installment Sales, 2 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 148, 157-58 (1935).
14 E.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947) ; Seeman v. Biemann,
108 Wisc. 365, 84 N.W. 490 (1900). See 5 A. COREiN, CONTRAcTS § 1058 (1964).
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determine the terms of a contract.'5 Courts may now examine un-
bargained terms without disturbing those terms that have been co-
determined, and unilaterally determined terms can be subjected to
special scrutiny.
Second, the unconscionability doctrine can improve the stability
of contracts. It seems that courts have always regulated contracts for
unfairness. But prior cases created problems because of the sur-
repetitious manner of decision, the misused technical devices, and the
uncertainty produced by their use. Under the Code, courts will not
have to use surreptitious devices in such cases. Because the courts can
use overt, instead of covert, methods,' 6 some of the uncertainties should
be eliminated. Opinions may now state the reasons that actually in-
fluenced decision, and the attorney's ability to predict how a court will
decide future similar cases should increase. Increased predictability
should also increase the stability of contracts.
However, uncertainty will result if the reasons used by the bench
are not susceptible to analysis by the bar. If a rationale can be stated
only in subjective terms, its usefulness in increasing predictability is
greatly diminished.' 7  The extent to which the unconscionability doc-
trine will enhance the stability of contracts depends heavily on the
ability of the bench and bar to formulate solid definitions of the basic
concepts involved. On the other hand, it must be recognized that it is
irrelevant to compare predictability under the unconscionability doc-
trine to predictability under a mythical jurisprudential system in which
courts never consider the fairness of contract terms they are asked
to enforce.
II. WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE?-A CONCEPTUAL APPROAC]
A conceptual analysis of the unconscionability doctrine presents
two basic questions: what concepts are involved, and how is uncon-
15 The ambivalent nature of "freedom of contract" is somewhat alleviated in
German legal theory by a conceptual analysis that recognizes 2 distinct elements.
The "bargaining" element-the power to co-determine the terms of the contract-is
called the Gestaltungsfreiheit. The "Agreement"' element-the freedom to decide
whether to enter the transaction-is called the Abschtussfreiheit. Disregarding fully
monopolistic enterprises, the Abschlussfreiheit includes the freedom left to the con-
sumer to decide with whom he will contract. But the Gestaltungsfreiheit is lacking in
consumer transactions based on standard form contracts. Lenhoff, Contracts of
Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of
American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L. REv. 481, 482 (1962). The development of
fair exchange concepts has been traced quite thoroughly in Dawson, Economic Duress
and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law, 11 TUL. L. REv. 345 (1937),
12 Tur. L. REv. 42 (1937).
18 "Covert tools are never reliable tools." Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 1-ARv. L.
REv. 700, 703 (1939).
1 It must be recognized that even subjective overt tools are better than covert
tools, because the former give insight into the actual manner of decision even if they
are not always subject to analysis.
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scionability defined? The two questions are different and involve
different problems. An answer to the first question need only illuminate
a structure for analyzing problems presented; but an answer to the
second is impossible in any rigorous sense, and even if possible, would
be undesirable. However, it is possible to shed light on the concepts
involved without attempting rigorous definition, for the doctrine is
the product of an examinable background that includes prior case law,
statements by the draftsmen, the drafting history of the statutory
section, and the Official Comments. In addition, there is now a case-
law gloss on the statute which will be examined in the next section of
the article.
Section 2-302 itself provides neither a definition of the term "un-
conscionable" nor an elaboration of the conceptual framework of the
doctrine. Instead, the section describes the remedies available to a
court once it has found an unconscionable contract or clause. The
section requires a hearing to be held before the court determines
whether unconscionability is present."8 In making a decision on un-
conscionability, the court is required to examine the commercial setting
of the individual transaction, thereby prohibiting use of standardized
rules. Each case must be judged on its own particular facts; there is
no exception to the hearing requirement once unconscionability is
claimed.' 9 The statutory language both does not define the concept
and provides procedures which hinder the development of a rigid
definition.
The origin of the concept of unconscionability is somewhat
obscure." Although both equity and law courts employed the term
frequently, no explicit rule was formulated. The doctrine was used
commonly to deny specific performance in sales of realty involving in-
18 UCC §2-302(2).
19But see Sinkhoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446,
273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966), denying a hearing on a motion for a preliminary
injunction.
20 One of the earliest references to the concept of unconscionability, if not the
earliest, was made by Lord Hardwicke in the famous case of Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch. 1751). Lord Hardwicke viewed the unconscionable
bargain as giving rise to the presumption of fraud.
[Fraud] may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain
itself; such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on
the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other;
which are unequitable and unconscientious bargains ....
Id. at 100. See also 3 J. PommoY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENcE §§ 923-24 (5th ed. 1941);
1 J. STORY, EQurrY JuRISpRUDENCE § 351 (14th ed. 1918). Lord Hardwicke noted
that even the common law had taken notice of this type of bargain. See, e.g., James V.
Morgan, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1664) ; Thornborow v. Whitacre, 92 Eng. Rep. 270
(KB. 1706). Although the term "unconscionable" was not used by these courts,
they both permitted the defendants to pay less than they had contracted to pay because
of the extreme harshness of the contracts.
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adequate consideration; 21 however, its use was not limited to such
cases. The doctrine was also applied to require specific performance
of contracts for the sale of goods ' and other types of contracts.2 Law
courts used the doctrine to reduce the amount recoverable below that
of technical contract damages.2 4
Some doubt has been raised whether the theory of these cases
validly bears on the concept in the statute.' Since the arguments
concerning the relationship of prior cases to section 2-302 are derived
primarily from the Official Comments to the Code, further discussion
of the substantive teachings of the prior case law will be postponed
until after this relationship, and the Comments, have been examined in
more detail.2"
One obvious source of information about the meaning of statutory
language is the writings of the draftsman, 2 7 in this case Karl N.
2 1 E.g., Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U.S. 285 (1907) ; Mangold v. Bacon, 237 Mo. 496,
141 S.W. 650 (1911); RESTATMENT OF CONTRAcTs § 367 (1932); 3 3. PomERoY, EQurT
JURISPRUDENCE §§924-28 (5th ed. 1941) and cases cited therein. For contracts in-
herently one-sided or unconscionable, see 5 J. PomxEoy, EguITY JURISPRUDENcE
§§ 2209 n.98 (4th ed. 1919) and cases cited therein.
2 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); Dessert Seed Co.
v. Garbus, 66 Cal. App. 2d 838, 153 P.2d 184 (1944).
23Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892) (patent contract); Weeks v.
Pratt, 43 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1930) (patent contract) ; In re Chicago Reed & Furniture
Co., 7 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1925) (loan) ; Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 135
P.2d 179 (1943) (contract to repay debt from boxing receipts); Miller v. Laneda,
75 Ore. 349, 146 P. 1090 (1915) (exclusive sales contract).
4 Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889); Baxter v. Wales, 12 Mass. 365
(1815) ; Leland v. Stone, 10 Mass. 459 (1813) ; Thornborow v. Whitacre, 92 Eng.
Rep. 270 (K.B. 1705); James v. Morgan, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1663).
25 Leff, supra note 3, at 534, 537, 538, 541.
26 See text accompanying note 81 infra.
2 7 Statements of draftsmen have often been accepted in federal courts as indica-
tive of legislative intent. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distilleries Corp.,
341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951) ; Kaline v. United States, 235 F.2d 54, 63, 64 (9th Cir.
1956) ; United States v. Rehwald, 44 F.2d 663 (S.D. Cal. 1930).
State courts, however, have been reluctant to consider the testimony of drafts-
men. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dwight v. Chicago R. Co., 270 Ill. 87, 105-06, 110
N.E. 386, 393 (1915) ; Third District Land Co. v. Toka, 170 So. 793, 795 (La. App.
1936) ; Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores Ass'n v. Kerngood, 171 Md. 426, 430,
189 A. 209, 210 (1937). But see Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 19 N.J. 578,
584-85, 118 A.2d 28, 31-32 (1955) ; Tappan Washington Memorial Corp. v. Margetts,
9 N.J. Super. 212, 217-218, 75 A.2d 823, 826 (1950).
Although draftsmen's comments have been accepted as a useful source of legisla-
tive history, their testimony has usually been before an official body, i.e., a committee
or commission. Reference to draftsmen's comments in this article will not be so
limited, but will also include extrinsic writings-some of which appeared subsequent
to promulgation of the Code. Although a court may take a dim view of the use of
such material, cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947) ;
Glen Cove Theatres, Inc. v. City of Glen Cove, 36 Misc. 2d 772, 774-75, 233
N.Y.S.2d 972, 974-75 (Sup. Ct. 1962), it is doubtful whether its use is inappropriate in
an article of this nature. Llewellyn's statements cannot realistically be disregarded as
an unreliable source in ascertaining the meaning of the concept of unconscionability.
See 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5010 (1943); Mooney, Old
Kontract Priwiples and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of our
New Commercial Law, 11 VIiL. L. Rxv. 213, 222-24 (1966); Comment, Statutory
Construction--Legislative Intent-Use of Extrinsic Aids in Wisconsin, 1964 Wis. L.
REv. 660, 664-67 nn. 26-30. See also Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legisla-
tion is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HAav. J. LEafs. 191, 219, 220 (1966).
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Llewellyn. 25  At first, the unconscionability doctrine was limited to a
defense against form contract abuses. 9 Llewellyn believed that the
form contract transaction represents two contracts.80  One contract
comprises the "dickered" terms, those actually bargained for, to which
the non-drafting party has manifested a specific assent. The other
comprises the "supplementary boilerplate" contract, based on the un-
discussed (and almost certainly unread) 31 terms printed on the form.
The non-drafting party does not manifest any specific assent to the
supplementary boilerplate contract. He assents only to the general
pattern of the transaction, and to any reasonable and decent terms
which might be expected in such a transaction, in addition to those
bargained for.'
It is obvious that this analysis does not fit into the detailed doc-
trines of the First Restatement of Contracts,3" and probably does not
fit within the Second Restatement34 It does, however, fit within
the more basic Restatement concepts of manifested assent.3  Although
the cases have traditionally held that a party who signs a writing
28 There is little doubt that Llewellyn, as the chief reporter and draftsman of the
Code, played a significant role in promulgating its provisions. Mooney, supra note 27,
at 222-24. Llewellyn had a special interest in § 2-302. The first proposed draft is
found with a covering letter from Professor Llewellyn. Leff, supra note 3, at 489 n.12.
Llewellyn was also the most outspoken of the draftsmen. See Hearings Before the
New York Law Revision Commission on the Uniform Commercial Code 121, 176-78
(1954) [hereinafter cited as 1954 Hearings]. Llewellyn referred to § 2-302 as "per-
haps the most valuable section in the entire Code." Id. 121.
29 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM RnvisrS SALES ACT § 24 (3d draft 1943) [hereinafter cited as 1943 DRAFT].
30K. LLEw YN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960). The basic
pattern, although not yet fully developed, can also be seen earlier in Llewellyn, Book
Review, 52 HAgv. L. REv. 700 (1939).
The notion of 2 contracts arising out of one transaction is not new to the com-
mon law. For over one hundred years a sale transaction with explicit words of
warranty created both a sale contract and a warranty contract. The collateral
warranty contract was needed at that time to protect the buyer after delivery and
payment because the sale contract was thought to be completely executed after pay-
ment and delivery. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 107 (1960).
3 1 See authorities cited in note 5 supra.
3 2 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960).
33
§ 70. EFFECT OF MAKING OR ACCEPTING A WRITTEN OFFER
One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who manifests
acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand
to be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant
of the terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932).
34 Section 5A of the Second Restatement seems to continue the basic policy of
§ 70 of the First Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5A (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1964). But the original § 70 has been deleted and is now covered in
§§ 20-23 and chapter 9, and no reference is made to § 5A. Consequently, the full
significance of § 5A must await the drafting of chapter 9.
3
5 Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 19(b) (1932) ; 1 & 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§§ 33, 607 (1964); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 90B, 90C, 90D, 95A (1957).
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manifests his assent to all written terms,86 this reasoning is not in-
escapable. For example, there is no common understanding that the
printing on forms can alter or impair dickered terms. The use of
forms in transactions between businessmen indicates little reliance on
the force of the printed terms." If there is no such reliance, the signing
of a printed form cannot be said to manifest an intention to limit
dickered terms.
Llewellyn's concept of the form contract indicates the type of
limitation he sought in this area. The assent given to printed terms
is limited and known to be limited, and the implicit limitations should
be considered by the courts in reading the document. The limitations
have two aspects. First, printed terms may not "alter or impair the
fair meaning of the dickered terms when read alone." " This rule is
remarkably similar to the English doctrine of fundamental breach,8 9
and comparable to the UCC's limitations on disclaimers of the de-
scription of the goods or other expressed affirmations.' Second, boiler-
plate may not be manifestly unreasonable or unfair, either in particular
terms or in net effect.4 The concept of "manifest unreasonableness"
is known in commercial law,' although it is not a precisely definable
term.
The amorphous nature of the terms "unconscionable," "mani-
festly unreasonable," and "fundamental breach" was certainly intended.
Llewellyn made this clear at the New York Law Revision Commission
hearings, where he testified that although business lawyers tend to
draft form contracts to claim all conceivable rights, their clients do not
feel this is necessary. Absent abnormal circumstances, businessmen are
satisfied if the boilerplate achieves a "fair" allocation of risks, which
Llewellyn characterized as taking no more than "80 per cent of the
pie." 43 If a draftsman seeks more of the pie through contract clauses,
he is usually being unreasonable, taking more than was commercially
31E.g., Dobler v. Story, 268 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959); Rossi v. Douglas, 203
Md. 190, 100 A.2d 3 (1953); Rosner v. Zurich Ins. Co., 197 Pa. Super. 90, 177
A.2d 30 (1962) ; 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 90A (1957).
:37See Apsey, The Battle of the Forms, 34 No=a DAME LAW. 556 (1959);
Resnick, Conflicting Boiler Plate-Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 Bus.
LAW. 401 (1963).
38 K LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960).
09 The English doctrine of "fundamental breach" is based on the theory that a
primary obligation or core duty arises from the relationship created by the contract
regardless of its specific terms. The effect of this doctrine is to invalidate those
excepting clauses which nullify the core duty or primary obligation of the contract.
For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 64-67 & 129-30 infra and authori-
ties cited therein.
40UCC § 2-316 (1).
4 1 
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrrloN 370-71 (1960).
4 2 See UCC §§ 1-102(3) ; 1-204(1) ; 4-103(1).
431954 Hearings 177.
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justified, and possibly forcing unconscionable terms on the non-
drafting party.
Through the unconscionability doctrine, Llewellyn tried to inhibit
the businessman or attorney from automatically asserting all con-
ceivable rights in all transactions. Such a purpose requires that the
doctrine be incapable of exact definition. If exact definition were
possible, draftsmen could draft to the threshold of unconscionability,
recreating the problem in a slightly different context, and defeating the
purpose of the doctrine.
Did Llewellyn then intend to create a completely unlimited doc-
trine? The answer is uncertain. He believed that the doctrine was
adequately safeguarded because unconscionability was a question of
law for the courts, not the jury.44 A case-law gloss was expected to
build up quickly around the bare statutory words, establishing prece-
dents to guide courts, and establishing limitations on the doctrine.
Consistency within a state would be achieved by appellate court review.
The establishment of limitations was left to the discretion of the courts,
especially the appellate courts, without explicit guidelines in the statu-
tory language. If one trusts courts to establish reasonable limits in
such a situation, the safeguards against unintended expansion are
adequate 5 Without such trust, safeguards seem lacking.
The concept expounded by Llewellyn was related to his view of
the actual expectations of the parties in the form contract transaction.
Draftsmen were to be deterred from producing contracts embodying
abuses similar to the known, but not rigorously defined flaws of funda-
mental breach and manifest unreasonableness. The printed clauses
could not alter or eviscerate the dickered terms, and the printed clauses
could not be unreasonable or unfair, either individually or in total
effect. The amorphous quality of the unconscionability doctrine was
intended, and adequate regulation was left to the discretion of the
courts.
If this was the original understanding, the drafting history of
section 2-302 shows that the concept was later consistently enlarged.
44UCC § 2-302(1) ; 1954 Hearings 178.
45 Llewellyn's trust in the inherent good sense and fairness of courts in reaching
such decisions is well documented throughout his CommoN LAw TRADrION. See note
40 supra. Courts would also be aided by the fact that the background of any transac-
tion would be admissible to show the purpose and commercial setting of any contract
language used. UCC § 2-302(2). See also King, New Conceptualism of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Ethics, Title, and Good Faith Purchase, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 15
(1966). For 2 recent decisions insisting on evidence of the commercial setting of
the contract see In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Central
Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct 1967).
The civil law cases using the laesio enormis doctrine indicate that courts approach
such doctrines conservatively. See Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange
in French and German Law, 11 TUL. L. REv. 345, 364-76 (1937); 12 TUL. L. REv.
42 (1937).
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Although originally limited to form contracts,46 the present version
of section 2-302 applies to all contracts.47 The original version sought
to insulate all dickered terms, whether unfair or not,48 but the present
version does not do so. The original version struck down a contract
only if it was unfair "in its entirety," 49 while the section now applies
to individual clauses as well as to the entire contract. In fact, the only
principle that one can confidently derive from the drafting history of
section 2-302 is that the original narrow focus of the doctrine was
deliberately expanded in several respects. 5°
Another source of information about the meaning of the statutory
language is the Official Comments that accompany the statute.5 The
Official Comment to section 2-302 states: "The principle is one of the
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not of dis-
turbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." 62
This sentence has been pilloried endlessly as inconsistent.53  The terms
"unfair surprise" and "oppression" are no more concretely definable
than the term "unconscionable," so the Comment seems to offer slogan
words rather than an explanation of the purposes behind the statute.
Two terms may be more helpful than one, but "unfair surprise" and
" 1943 DRAFT §24.
47 UCC § 2-302(1). The form contract limitation disappeared in the 1948 draft.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW § 2-302 (1948) [herein-
after cited as 1948 DRAFT]. It should be noted that all of the UCC unconscionability
cases decided to date have involved form contracts.
48 1943 DRAFT § 24.
49 Id.
50 There is a question whether any of the pre-1952 legislative history may be con-
sulted. The 1952 draft stated that it could not be used. UCC § 1-102(3) (g) (1952)
[hereinafter cited as 1952 DRAFT]. Subsequent drafts, however, deleted this limita-
tion. The explanation given was that "changes from the text enacted in Pennsylvania
in 1953 are clearly legitimate legislative history." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE &
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1956 RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS]. This probably implies that only
post-1952 legislative history may be used.
As shown in an exhaustive article by Professor Leff, supra note 3, the prior
drafts of § 2-302 show little that cannot be gathered from the statutory language itself,
except for a constant expansion of the primary concept.
51 The Official Comments to the Code have been generally accepted as a valid
source for guidance when construing a specific section. The 1952 draft of the Code
expressly stated that the Comments "may be consulted in the construction and appli-
cation of this Act . . . ." 1952 DRAFT § 1-102(3) (f). Although this provision was
later deleted because "the old comments were clearly out of date and it was not known
when the new ones could be prepared," 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS 3, and although a
similar provision never reappeared, both courts and commentators have agreed that
the Comments may be used. See, e.g., Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to
the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 597, 598 n.3 and cases cited;
I NEW YORK LAW REvISiON COMM'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
158-60 (1955).
52 UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
5 See Leff, supra note 3, at 499-501; cf. Comment, Unconscionable Business Con-
tracts: A Doctrine Gone Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453 (1961).
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"oppression" do not seem to reveal the underlying rationale of un-
conscionability.
On the other hand, these two terms do offer a useful analytical
tool. They focus attention on two different types of abuses in the
process of forming a contract. Analysis under section 2-302 can begin
with a finding of one of these two varieties of "procedural" abuses.
"Unfair surprise" implies some sort of deception by artifice. "Op-
pression" implies some form of compulsion resulting from a lack of
opportunity to codetermine terms. However, merely finding a pro-
cedural abuse is insufficient; for the draftsman has indicated that the
primary target of the doctrine is the term that is unreasonable or
unfair. Thus some sort of "substantive" abuse must also be found.54
"Unfair surprise" is a relatively easy concept to visualize. Hid-
ing a clause in a mass of fine print trivia is one method of surprising
the non-drafting party with unknown terms. Another method is to
phrase the clause in language that is incomprehensible to a layman or
that diverts his attention from problems raised or rights lost. A variety
of deceptive sales practices and other tactics might be catalogued, but
the foregoing should suffice to indicate the type of problem covered by
"unfair surprise." Although there are overtones of fraud in such
conduct, "unfair surprise" does not require a particular source of
surprise, such as a misrepresentation of fact. Instead, "unfair surprise"
focuses on the effect of abuses on the non-drafting party, and upon
the "fairness" of whatever event caused the surprise. The causal event
might be active conduct by the drafting party, or it might be inaction,
but it is often difficult to distinguish the two, as in the use of language
designed to minimize attention to a clause. Thus the most productive
criterion for determining whether the procedural abuse of surprise is
present is the reasonableness of the non-drafting party's reaction to
the clause, rather than the culpability of the drafting party.
An abuse in the process of forming the contract is not sufficient by
itself to create unconscionability. The principle of preventing, not
merely "surprise," but "unfair surprise," suggests not only that there
must be abuses in forming the contract, but also that such abuses have
allowed the drafting party to take unfair advantage of the non-drafting
party. Not all deceptively worded clauses in fine print are unconscion-
able. Such a clause in a security agreement, giving the creditor the
4The terms "procedural" abuse and "substantive" abuse are taken from Leff,
supra note 3, and are used deliberately to emphasize the differences in the analytical
structures each of us perceives. Leff posits a structure in which one focuses on
either the procedural or the substantive abuse, but never on both. He then proceeds
to demonstrate that the presence of either alone should never be sufficient. This
approach may seem reasonable, but see text accompanying notes 80-93 infra, but it
avoids the real question posed by the cases decided under the Code: what should a court
do if both types of abuses are present?
944 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
right to repossess collateral after default, need not be considered un-
conscionable. The concept of "unfair surprise" involves both pro-
cedural and substantive abuses of the complaining party.55
"Oppression" is significantly harder to visualize than "unfair
surprise." Although "oppression" connotes duress, there are already
techniques for dealing with that. However, there are many trans-
actions in which one party, while having the choice of contracting or
not, has no choice of the terms of the contract-the contract of ad-
hesion.56  Present concepts of duress do not reach such conduct,57 but
opportunities for abuse are abundant, and protection can be provided
through a concept of oppression that encompasses non-bargaining of
the type generally associated with form contracts.
However, the concept of oppression involves more than non-
bargaining over contract terms, because such conduct shows only a
procedural abuse. Unequal bargaining power can often produce non-
bargaining, or very little serious bargaining, but these need not neces-
sarily cause unconscionable results. As with surprise, the resulting
terms must be considered in any attempt to apply the unconscionability
doctrine. Only where the surprise or non-bargaining has introduced
harsh terms may the contract or clause be attacked. There are at
least two distinctions between "oppression" and "allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power." " One distinction is the
difference between a factual condition (the presence of unequal bargain-
ing power) and conduct (non-bargaining)-a difference well-known in
labor law.59 The second distinction is the difference between reason-
able and unreasonable (harsh) resultant contract terms.
This analysis does not answer the most important question of all:
what types of contract terms are harsh enough to be subject to
attack? Other questions are also unanswered. What standards may
be used to measure such harshness? Are these standards different when
arising from surprise rather than oppression? Is it possible to apply
the unconscionability doctrine to situations in which there were no
abuses in the formation of the contract?
It is painfully apparent that section 2-302, and the Official Com-
ments as presently drafted, give very little assistance in answering such
questions. The Comment poses the standard that the terms must not
-5 See note 54 supra.
-56 See authorities cited in note 5 supra.
5 "See Dawson, Ecoiwndc Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mic. L. REv.
253 (1947) ; Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLum. L. REV.
603 (1943).
58 UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
59 See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 §§ 1, 8a, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151,
158(a)5 (1964) ; Norris-LaGuardia Act §2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
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be "so one-sided as to be unconscionable" relative to the "commercial
needs of the particular trade or case." " This standard seems to relate
to Llewellyn's concept of "80 per cent of the pie." 61 The difficulty
with its use is that the "needs" of a party in any particular situation
are usually determined by a subjective judgment, and a court's review
of that judgment is also likely to be subjective. Further, the Comment
does not indicate whether the same standard applies to both the
surprise and oppression situations.
A. Oppressive Terms
Llewellyn's comments, discussed earlier,' spoke precisely to the
problem of defining which terms are too one-sided. These comments
are limited to the form contract situation, or what the Official Com-
ments call "oppression." In this situation, the printed (non-bargained)
terms are too one-sided if they (1) alter or impair the fair meaning of
the dickered terms, or (2) are manifestly unreasonable. 6
The first of these limitations is comparable to the English doc-
trine of fundamental breach, which holds that primary obligations or
core duties arise from the relationship created by a contract, regardless
of the contract's specific terms."' Any printed clauses that attempt to
nullify these core duties are invalidated because they violate a "funda-
mental term" of the contract.e' Fundamental terms are discovered by
looking at the contract apart from the printed clauses to see
what are the terms, express or implied, which impose an ob-
ligation on the [drafting] party. If he has been guilty of a
breach of those obligations in a respect which goes to the very
root of the contract, he cannot rely on the exempting clauses. 66
60 UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
611954 Hearings 177.
42 See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
63Cf. 1949 DRAFT, Official Comment.
IN See Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach,
50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964). Meyer does an excellent job of discussing this doctrine,
its similarity to Llewellyn's views, and the simultaneous and analogous growth of the
doctrine of unconscionability. The doctrine of fundamental breach may have been
restricted recently in Suissee Atlantique Societe d' Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V.
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, [1967] A.C. 361, which stated both that the doctrine
was merely a construction technique (disapproving statements in prior cases), and
that it was not applicable to the present contract because a liquidated damages clause
was involved rather than an exceptions clause. Further enlightenment on the present
state of the doctrine must await a consumer transaction. (Sidsse Atlantique involved
a commercial transaction.) In any event, the comparisons made herein are to the
doctrine that developed to alleviate the problems arising in the context of the con-
sumer transactions, since only this doctrine is comparable to unconscionability in
purpose and scope.
65'Karsales Ltd. v. Wallis, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936 (C.A.).
6 Id. at 940 (emphasis added).
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If one substitutes "dickered terms" for "fundamental terms" in these
statements of the doctrine, the effect is the same as Llewellyn's first
limitation. The substitution is valid because the method of discovering
"fundamental terms" clearly focuses on the "dickered terms" of the
contract. 7 The UCC adopts a similar approach to express warranties:
a seller may not disclaim them.8 However, the UCC limitation on
disclaimer does not apply to implied terms. Thus the similarity de-
pends upon the extent of the obligation imposed by the "description
of the goods." 9
The second of Llewellyn's limitations is perhaps more familiar,
although less subject to analysis. The term "manifestly unreasonable"
is used several times in the Code 7 ' and has not been criticized for vague-
ness.7 "Reasonableness" is one of the obligations that may not be
disclaimed by agreement under the Code." Although the term could
be regarded as a mere abstraction, such a view would overlook the
cases that have interpreted the term.73  Further discussion of the
concept of unreasonableness is deferred to the section of this article
concerning the UCC's case-law gloss, 4 but it should be noted that
the standards of both fundamental breach and manifest unreasonable-
ness are objective to the extent that they depend upon a court's concept
of the fairness of contract terms.
B. Unfairly Surprising Terms
If Llewellyn's standards for oppression are applicable in the non-
bargaining situation, do the same standards apply to cases involving
67There have been difficulties with the English doctrine even in the consumer
context, because, to date, it has focused exclusively on exempting clauses. It might
be possible under the English version of fundamental breach to limit the fundamental
terms initially rather than drawing them broadly and then disclaiming. See Wedder-
burn, Contract-Exemption Claures-Fundametal Breach-Main Objectives of Co-
tracts, 1957 CAmi. L.J. 16, 20. But even if such formal circumvention of the purpose
of the English doctrine is possible, it would not be available under Llewellyn's concept
because the latter is not so narrowly drawn. See note 64 supra.
G8 UCC § 2-316(1).
89 Id. § 2-313(1) (b).
70 See id. §§ 1-102(3) ; 1-204; 4-103(1).
71 Cf., e.g., Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM L. REv. 798 (1958); Braucher, Article One: General Provisions, Sym-
posium, The Uniform Commercial Code, 4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASS. LAW 8 (1957).
'2UCC § 1-102(3).
73 See, e.g., Tu-Vu Drive-in Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 286, 391 P.2d 828,
830, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350 (1964) (reasonable restriction on alienation of stock);
Truesdale v. Friedman, 270 Minn. 109, 119-21, 132 N.W.2d 854, 861-62 (1965)
(reasonable time for notification of breach of warranty under Uniform Sales Act) ;
Pereault v. Hall, 94 N.H. 191, 194-95, 49 A.2d 812, 814 (1946) (reasonable con-
tractual restriction on marriage) ; Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super.
392, 397-99, 204 A.2d 494, 498 (1964) (reasonable time for notification of breach of
contract under UCC).
74 See text accompanying note 136 infra.
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"unfair surprise"? It would seem that the non-drafting party needs
additional protection where subterfuge has been used, whether or not
a form contract is involved. The gravamen of the complaint is that the
non-drafting party did not and should not have expected the term, not
that he was compelled to accept it. His expectations may have been
violated in a manner not related to a "core duty" or manifestly un-
reasonable, and yet this violation of expectations may be unreasonable
considering the deceptive circumstances involved. Therefore, the
standard applicable in the unfair surprise situation should take account
of whether the term was expected or not.
The pre-1952 drafting history, if it can be used to interpret the
Code,7" points to the same analysis. For example, when the Comments
limited the concept to "the prevention of unfair surprise," 76 uncon-
scionability was defined to depend upon whether clauses were "so one-
sided as not to be expected." "7 Only when the purposes of the doc-
trine were expanded to include oppression as well as unfair surprise
was "unexpectedness" abandoned as a definitional criterion.78 How-
ever, this abandonment should not prevent use of that criterion in the
unfair surprise situation. The abandonment does not imply a rejection
of the criterion in all cases, but only a recognition that it could not
apply to both the oppression and the surprise situations when the pur-
poses of the doctrine were expanded. "Unexpectedness" would not be
a useful criterion in defining unconscionability in the nature of oppres-
sion because a finding of oppression must depend upon a more objec-
tive view of the terms.
79
Thus different substantive standards are applicable in situations
involving different procedural abuses in forming the contract. In the
non-bargaining situation, the substantive standards relate to the court's
view of the reasonableness of the unbargained terms as compared to
the bargained terms of the contract. The non-drafting party has
opted to contract, but has had no choice as to the nature of many terms,
and the court may examine the boilerplate to determine whether it
subverts the fundamental duties expressly worried over. In the unfair
surprise situation, the emphasis shifts from the court's view of the
terms to the objecting party's reaction. He has been made unaware
of a contract term, and the court must consider whether that hidden
75 But see note 50 supra.
76 1950 DRAFT § 2-302, Comment 1.
77Id.
78 The Official Comment to the 1952 DA r included, as a purpose, the prevention
of "oppression." The same Comment stated the criterion to be whether "the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable." 1952 DRT § 2-302, Comment 1.
79 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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term violates his, not the court's, reasonable expectations under the
contract.
C. Substantive Abuses Only
There are instances in which the contract does contain some form
of "harsh term" even though there has been no significant abuse in the
formation of the contract. May a contract be unconscionable without
the procedural abuses of deception or non-bargaining? The Comment
to section 2-302 states that "the principle is one of the prevention of
oppression." o There are at least two different connotations of the
word "oppression," and the definition of the word will vary according
to which of them is emphasized. A court may find that "oppression"
connotes only those harsh terms obtained through oppressive means,
so that the definition of the term depends upon procedural abuses.
But a court may also interpret "oppression" to mean terms, however
obtained, that will create oppressive effects, so that procedural abuses
are irrelevant. Under this interpretation, the real question is whether
enforcement of the contract terms will result in oppression, rather than
whether those terms were caused by objectionable procedures. Al-
though either a result-oriented or a cause-oriented definition is arguably
correct, the case law supports at least a limited use of the former
definition.
There was an analogous, albeit limited, use of the unconscion-
ability doctrine in the pre-Code common law and equity cases. Al-
though it has been suggested that there is no valid relationship be-
tween the unconscionability doctrine under the Code and that in the
prior case law, it is at least arguable that such a relationship is set
forth in the Comments."' Nor would lack of such a relationship pre-
clude its independent use as a method of attacking abusive contract
terms under the terminology of unconscionability. The case law doc-
trine was not particularly limited, being used at law and in equity, in
realty and non-realty cases, for damages as well as specific perform-
so UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
81 Notwithstanding the alleged coyness of a cf. reference, the Official Comment
citation of Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948), does indicate
that the draftsmen were aware of the case law concept of unconscionability. That
the remaining cases cited do not expressly deal with unconscionability but are
commercial transaction disputes decided in law courts indicates the draftsmen's inten-
tion that the Code's unconscionability concept not be limited merely to equity cases,
but that it be used as a broad equitable tool to inject fairness into the whole range
of commercial dealing.
The conclusion that prior cases are relevant is buttressed by the apparent under-
standing of the various enacting state legislatures. See authorities cited in Leff, mtpra
note 3, at 528 n.166. Various practice commentaries to annotated state statutes also
indicate this understanding. See, e.g., Comments to DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 2-302
(Spec. UCC Pamphlet 1967) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.2-302 (1966) ; IiL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 26, § 2-302 (Smith-Hurd 1963) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 402.302 (1964).
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ance.' The general purposes of the two unconscionability doctrines
seem identical: to prevent oppressive results through abuse of legal
technicalities. There is, in any event, much overlap, and interchange
of concepts must be expected in two doctrines that are so closely related
in purpose, coverage and effect.83
The older cases set forth no concrete criteria for defining uncon-
scionability. However, most of the cases indicate that some form of
procedural abuse in the formation of the contract is required, as well
as a substantive abuse. In the formation of contracts, there are ex-
amples of concealment of important facts and other trickery that do
not meet common law fraud requirements." There are also examples
of one party's taking unfair advantage of his position, and of other
overreaching not sufficient to create duress.'s In certain stylized fact
situations, where the contracting party was weak, illiterate, or old, the
courts would almost assume abuses in contract-formation.86 Different
types of harsh terms were recognized. An entire contract might be
considered too one-sided to enforce,87 or individual clauses might be
regarded with disfavor."8 Another harsh feature was inadequate
consideration based on disparity of price, usually in a land sale
transaction. 9
8 See authorities cited in notes 18-23 supra.
,S3 As long ago as 190S, Dean Roscoe Pound espoused the theory that statutory
language and concepts would and should be reasoned from analogously just as court
decisions and arguments are currently utilized. Pound, Common Law and Legislation,
21 H v. L. REv. 383 (1908). A purposive theory of statutory interpretation more
in tune with Pound's prediction has been heralded in some recent case law. See,
e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), noted in 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1336
(1964) ; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) ; Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); United States v. Perma Paving Co.,
332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964), noted in 65 CoLum. L. REv. 339 (1965). For a deeper
discussion of this theory of statutory interpretation, see Comment, The Doctrine of
Uwmotscionability, 19 MAINE L. Rxv. 81, 86-91 (1967).
An example of exchange between doctrines that are closely related in purpose,
coverage and effect is the growth of warranty concepts from their beginnings to the
present, characterized by the recurring interchange of ideas betveen contract and tort.
See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on Tudicial Eclipses, Pigeonholes, and Communication Barriers,
17 W. RES. L. REv. 5 (1965); Littlefield, Some Thoughts on Products Liability
Law: A Reply to Professor Shanker, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 10 (1966) ; Donovan, Recent
Development in Products Liability Litigation in Nw England: The Emerging Con-
frontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts atd the Uniform Commercial Code,
19 MAINE L. REv. 181 (1967).
8 4 See, e.g., Thornborow v. Whitacre, 92 Eng. Rep. 270 (K.B. 1706) ; James v.
Morgan, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1664); Baxter v. Wales, 12 Mass. 365 (1815);
5 J. PoERoy, EQUrrY JtrRISPRUDENcE §§ 2206-08 (4th ed. 1919).
85ee, e.g., Gierth v. Fidelity Trust Co., 93 N.f. Eq. 163, 115 A. 397 (1921);
Caivano v. Brill, 171 Misc. 298, 11 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.12. Mun. Ct. 1939). See generally
Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspectiv, 45 MCrr. L. REv. 253 (1947).
86See 3 J. PomERoy, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §948 (5th ed. 1941).
8
7 See' e.g., Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 US. 224 (1892) ; Clark v. Rosario
Mining & Milling Co., 176 F. 180 (9th Cir. 1910'; Miller v. Laneda, 75 Ore. 349,
146 P. 1090 (1915) ; 5 J. PomERoY, EUrrY JuRis;uDENcE § 2208 n.98 (4th ed. 1919).
8
8 See, e.g., Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 84, 135 P.2d 179 (1943).
9 See authorities cited in note 21 supra.
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Where the court considered the terms especially harsh, only a
slight procedural abuse would be necessary." A sliding scale was used:
the harsher the terms, the less concerned the court seemed about the
method used to create those terms. In some cases the courts found the
contract terms unconscionable without expressly examining the process
by which the contract was formed." Even Campbell Soup Co. v.
Wentz,92 cited in the Official Comment to section 2-302, does not dwell
at any great length on contract formation problems, except to state that
Campbell supplied the contract. 3 Apparently, especially harsh terms
alone could be sufficient, although this approach was reserved for
unusual cases. This type of case supports limited use of a result-
oriented definition of "oppression."
Unfortunately, the cases do not define such concepts as "harsh
terms" or "overreaching." They do furnish many examples of fact
situations that are or are not unconscionable, but there is little effort
either to explain why the court thought a contract too one-sided, or to
establish criteria of how one-sided a contract could not be. However,
the analytical structure that may be derived from the pre-Code cases
is roughly analogous to the structure that may be derived independently
from the Official Comments to analyze unconscionability under the
Code. In the typical case both abuses in contract formation and harsh-
ness in the contract terms are required. Contract formation abuses
arise from factors akin to either of the criteria in the Code's Official
Comment: unfair surprise (concealment of important facts) or oppres-
sion (taking unfair advantage of one's position). Harshness in terms
arises from overall imbalance of the entire contract or from a par-
ticularly unreasonable individual clause.
Although the analytical structure from the cases is basically similar
to that previously derived from the Comments, there are some interest-
ing additions and modifications. The most important of these is the
courts' handling of procedural abuses. In addition to surprise and
oppression, contract formation abuses were found present in certain
stylized types of situations commonly recognized by equity courts to
protect particular classes of parties deemed unable to fully protect
themselves. Further, in maty cases the courts did not expressly deter-
mine whether procedural abvses were present or not, but concentrated
VO See Schroeder v. Young, 151 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1896) : "While mere inadequacy
of price has rarely been held suficient . . . courts are not slow to seize upon other
circumstances impeaching the fairiess of the transaction .... especially if the inade-
quacy be so gross as to shock he conscience." (emphasis added) Compare 3 J.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 9 926 (5th ed. 1941) with id. § 927.
91 See authorities cited note 87?spra.
*2 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
3 Id. at 83.
UNCONSCIONIABILITY PROBLEMS
on judging the fairness of the contract terms. In effect, they used a
sliding scale, concerning themselves greatly with procedural abuses
if the harshness of the terms was open to some dispute, but disregard-
ing them where the terms were patently unreasonable. Thus the
older case law analysis indicates that the presence of sufficiently harsh
terms can constitute unconscionability, without regard to an exam-
ination of the contract formation process. They therefore support the
limited use of a result-oriented definition of "oppression."
D. Price Disparity
Price disparity is usually considered a unique form of "harsh
term," " because neither form of procedural abuse is thought to be
present. The price term is often expressly agreed upon so that surprise
cannot be claimed, and absent a monopoly situation, a refusal to bargain
over price is thought justifiable. Since the Comments do not make
any reference to price disparity, it is difficult to argue from them that
the abuse should or should not be considered in determining whether
a contract is unconscionable. The older case law doctrine did recognize
price disparity as a potential abuse,"5 but relief was not usually
granted unless the price disparity was accompanied by other inequitable
factors. 6 Price disparity was considered a form of substantive abuse
subject to equitable relief if induced by a procedural abuse. However,
a sufficiently gross price disparity would be sufficient to require relief,
even though not accompanied by other inequitable factors.97 A result-
oriented definition of unconscionability using a sliding scale approach
would similarly allow extreme disparity of price to constitute uncon-
scionability, but even if the result-oriented definition is not accepted,
price disparity is one form of inequitable factor to be considered in
determining whether contract terms are harsh or not.
A result-oriented approach is analogous to the civil law doctrine
of laesio enormis.9" Although there is no direct link between laesio
enormis and either the Code or the common law unconscionability doc-
trines, the influence of civil law on those writers who tried to deal
94 See Leff, supra note 3, at 548-49; Comment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 895 (1965);
Comment, 20 MMNE L. REv. 159 (1968) ; Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1305 (1968).
9 5 Price disparity amounting to "unconscionable consideration" has been made
grounds for granting recovery to certain Indian tribes in suits against the United
States. The Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70(a) (1964), expressly
provides for recovery in this unique unconscionability situation. See, e.g., Sac & Fox
Indian Tribe v. United States, 340 F.2d 368 (Ct. Cl. 1964) ; Miami Tribe v. United
States, 281 F2d 202 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
96 3 J. PomEoy, EQuTY JURiSpRUDENcE § 926 (5th ed. 1941).
1 7 1d. §927.
9 8See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 13, at 364-76; Leff, supra note 3, at 549.
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with adhesion contract problems is obvious. 9 Each of the doctrines
seeks the same purpose, to prevent oppressive results, and each is
founded on the unwillingness of courts to enforce a very hard bargain.
In summary, the unconscionability doctrine perceived through this
conceptual approach has a structure, and concrete fact situations are
subject to analysis under it. In the usual unconscionability case, both
procedural and substantive abuses occur, and the type of substantive
abuse required depends upon the type of procedural abuse present.
Terms procured by artifice may be unconscionable if the complaining
party's reasonable expectations were violated ("unfair surprise").
Artifice is therefore considered a particularly heinous procedural abuse,
so the harshness of the terms is dependent upon the complaining party's
reaction to them. Terms procured by non-bargaining may be uncon-
scionable if they are manifestly unreasonable or if they impair the fair
meaning of the dickered terms ("oppression"). Non-bargaining is
therefore considered a less serious procedural abuse, so substantive
abuses are judged according to the court's view of their fairness. In
all cases, a sliding scale is used, so that unconscionability may be found
in a severely harsh term although the procedural abuse was mild, and
vice versa. Price disparity may also be considered a substantive abuse.
It is arguable that a court should be able to find unconscionability
in especially severe substantive abuses alone, without expressly con-
sidering procedural abuses. The older case law furnishes precedent for
such an analysis, and exchange of concepts between the two doctrines
should be expected. One ramification of such a theory is that a gross
price disparity, without any other abuse, may constitute unconscion-
ability.
III. WHAT Is THE DOCTRINE ?-THE CASES
There is now a case law gloss on the statute, and the draftsmen
expected this to provide substance to the unconscionability concept. 10 0
Any discussion of the doctrine must determine whether the con-
ceptually derived analytical structure explains the cases, and whether
the cases have added to that structure. It should consider not only the
cases that announce holdings under section 2-302, but also the cases
outside article 2 that rely on the same concepts.' 01
19 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 CoLuMr.
L. REv. 1072, 1074-75 n.15, 1077 n.23, 1080 n.44 (1953) ; Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion
and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of American and
Foreign Law, 36 TuL. L. REv. 481 (1962); Wilson, Freedomn of Contract and
Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 172, 179-81 (1965).
1001954 Hearings; K LLEWELLYN, TiE CoMMoN LAw TRArrior 178 (1960).
101 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
In re Elldns-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Unico v. Owen, 50
N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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There are several methods of comparing an analytical structure to
the case decisions. One approach is to analyze the reasoning of the
opinions and attempt to fit the expressed analysis of the judges into
the analytical framework. However, a reading of the cases in the area
will show that this is not possible, because the decisions do not enunciate
their reasoning in sufficient detail. The typical opinion carefully states
what facts the complaining party might rely upon to show the presence
of unconscionability, but, because of the procedural setting of the
cases on appeal, cannot rigorously evaluate the legal effect of the facts.
The majority of the cases on appeal present records that do not com-
pletely set forth the commercial setting, purpose and effect of the con-
tracts or clauses being attacked, so that the appellate court cannot rule
upon the presence of unconscionability.'0 2 For example, in Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,0 3 evidence on these matters had
not been presented at the trial, and the appellate court was unable to
pursue its analysis further than to announce criteria for the trial court
to follow in determining whether the contract was unconscionable.'
Many of the cases raise unconscionability only as an alternative
ground of decision," 5 and therefore do not present a rigorous or de-
tailed analysis of the unconscionability issue.'0 6 American Home Im-
provement, Inc. v. Maclver illustrates the technique.0 7  The court first
voided the contract for failure to comply with a disclosure statute, and
then held the contract unconscionable. It is unrealistic to expect a
detailed analytical structure in such circumstances, since neither the
statute itself nor the law reviews have provided one.
A second method of comparing an analytical structure to case
decisions, and the one that will be used here, is to analyze the fact
102 Some cases present incomplete data for deciding the unconscionability issue,
forcing remand: Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) ; lit re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; Fairfield Lease
Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
In other cases unconscionability was discussed but not made the stated ground of the
decision: Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967) (citing
UCC § 1-102(3) rather than § 2-302); Romine Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 117 Ga.
App. 353 (1968) ; Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) ; Granite Worsted
Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 29 App. Div. 2d 303, 287 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1968)
(arbitrator's decision binding on court as well as parties) ; Paragon Homes, Inc. v.
Crace, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Paragon Homes, Inc. v.
Langlois, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
103 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
104 Id. at 450.
105 American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964); David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55 Misc.2d 1080, 287 N.Y.S.2d
503 (Civ. Ct. 1968); Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 15
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275
N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
106 K LlawELLYv, THE CommoN LAtw TRADrrioN 306-09 (1960).
107 American Home Improvement Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964).
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situations presented in the cases according to the conceptually derived
structure. If this analysis leads to the same results provided by the
cases, the two can fairly be said to be compatible. The factual analysis
could then provide more solid statements of the basic concepts involved
by illustrating the criteria used in a more detailed manner than is
possible in a conceptual approach. Analysis of the cases may also
indicate additions to the conceptually derived structure or preferences
between alternatives available under it.
The cases furnish many examples of both of the procedural abuses,
surprise and oppression. Surprise has been found in fine-print clauses
of significant importance to the non-drafting party that the court felt
would not normally come to his attention during the consummation
of the transaction. ° Another example of surprise is the inclusion of
a promise in a document that would not be taken as a contract by the
non-drafting party."0 9 Courts have found unconscionable surprise
where a salesman has deliberately emphasized other aspects of the
transaction to such an extent that the buyer was misled about the true
import of the obligation he assumed." Other examples are the con-
tract written in a language not understood by the non-drafting party,"'
and a clause drafted in language so technical that the layman could not
be expected to understand it, or at least to appreciate its full meaning"l1
Perhaps surprise also includes the drafting of terms, such as price
terms, so that their full import cannot be understood by the non-
drafting party.""
It has been argued that regardless of its availability in cases in-
volving surprise, the unconscionability doctrine should not be used in
other situations to invalidate the terms of a contract, especially where
the meaning of the terms is understood by both parties. 14 It is clear
that the courts are willing to review contracts for oppressive terms,
108 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 365-67, 161 A2d 69,
73-74 (1960) ; Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 111, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967). It should
be noted that the courts in these cases did not articulate the concept of "surprise."
109 David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55 Misc.2d 1080, 287 N.Y.S.2d
503 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
IN0 State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup.
Ct. 1967) ; Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd on issue of damages, 54 Misc.2d 119, 281 N.Y.S2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
111 Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code would promote the same result.
U3C §6.111(3) (e).
11 2 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
113 American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A2d 886
(1964); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd on issue of damages, 54 Misc2d 119, 281 N.Y.S2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
114 See Leff, supra note 3, at 499-501.
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without regard to whether or not the parties are aware of the terms or
appreciate their oppressiveness. Where two businessmen contract, even
though one is in necessitous circumstances, surprise does not seem to
exist. However, in this situation the courts have been willing to order
hearings on the unconscionability issue," 5 indicating that surprise is
not the only procedural abuse within the doctrine.
The courts seem to recognize different varieties of oppression, and
may consider some non-bargaining techniques more oppressive than
others. The most typical example of non-bargaining is the form con-
tract of adhesion in which the drafting party does not bargain over the
fine-print, boilerplate clauses. However, the oppressiveness of the
situation cannot be judged only by the presence or absence of a form
contract. A stronger case of form contract oppression is presented
when the transaction involves purchasing a necessity rather than a
luxury," 6 dealing with a quasi-public institution rather than a private
entrepreneur," 7 or dealing with a necessitous borrower or buyer rather
than one in a position to bargain and choose."' The strongest case
for form contract oppression seems to be presented by the poor, naive
consumer confronted with high-pressure sales tactics." 9 Perhaps this
indicates the creation of a new class of persons to whom the courts
will grant special protection.120
Some opinions have not expressly examined abuses in contract
formation at any length, concentrating instead on the abusiveness of
the substantive terms of the contract.'21 Such an approach parallels
"15 In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 871-75 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; Fair-
field Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 858 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966). But cf. Sinkhoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51
Misc.2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
111 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386, 161 A.2d 69, 85
(1960).
17 David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55 Misc.2d 1080, 1085, 287
N.Y.S2d 503, 508-09 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
118 Iit re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp., 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See also
authorities cited note 119 infra.
119 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
State cx rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct.
1967) ; Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Nassau
County Dist. Ct. 1966), revd on isse of damages, 54 Misc.2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d
964 (Sup. Ct 1967).
120 Among those previously sheltered by the unconscionability rationale have been
the unsophisticated farmer, careless sailors, the naive young, the easily defrauded
old and the unfortunate physically disabled. See 3 J. PomEaoy, EQuTRY .RrspgrDEcE
§ 948 (5th ed. 1941). The U3C would protect certain types of consumers in this
manner. U3C § 6.111 (3) (e).
21 lI re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); American
Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A2d 886 (1964); Paragon
Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 56 Misc.2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct 1968) ; Frostifresh
Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on issue of
damages, 54 Misc2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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that of the pre-Code cases. 22 However, analysis of the facts reveals
that contract formation abuses were present in these cases, so that
failure to discuss this aspect of the cases does not necessarily indicate
that the decisions were based on substantive abuses alone.
A. Oppressive Terms-Impairment of Dickered Terms
The cases illustrate procedural aspects of unconscionability (abuse
in the formation of the contract), and most of them involve some such
abuse. They also furnish examples of substantive abuses under un-
conscionability. There are examples of terms that alter or impair the
fair meaning of the dickered terms, and examples of unreasonable
terms. A prominent example of a term that impairs the dickered
terms is the warranty disclaimer clause. One court has struck down a
disclaimer in an automobile sales contract when the car "would not
move." 124 Although there were, as usual, multiple grounds for in-
validating the disclaimer, such as lack of conspicuousness,'- the court
stated that the seller's obligation extended beyond the written terms.
12
The opinion relies heavily upon Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
which voided a limitation of remedy clause as unconscionable because
it provided only illusory relief."h The remedies provided could not
protect the buyer of defective products, and did not perform the
essential purposes of such contract terms- 8
The resemblance of these cases to the English cases on funda-
mental breach is striking. The English courts have also held that
warranty disclaimer clauses will not protect the seller of an automobile
where "the car will not go." '2 The purchaser of an automobile ex-
pects a piece of machinery that can be used for transportation, and the
English courts will protect this expectation regardless of boilerplate
clauses in the contract. A defect of this magnitude is held to "go to the
root of the contract," which can be ascertained by "looking at the
1= See text at notes 83-93 supra.
123 American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Macver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964) could be interpreted as not involving any procedural abuse. However, this
seems a misreading of the opinion. See note 172 infra. For further discussion, see
text accompanying notes 171-73 infra.
124 Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
125 Id. at 447, 240 A.2d at 197. A full draft of the disclaimer was not presented
to buyer until after he contract was executed. Id. at 448, 240 A2d at 199.
126 Id. at 448, 240 A.2d at 199.
32 7 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
128Biet see UCC §2-719(2) & (3).
129 Karsales Ltd. v. Wallis, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936, 939 (C.A.). A case even more
similar on the facts is Yeoman Credit, Ltd. v. Apps, [1962] 2 Q.B. 508 (C.A. 1961).
See note 63 supra regarding recent possible limitations on the fundamental breach
doctrine.
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contract apart from" the disclaimer clauses.' 30 The same result could
be obtained under the UCC warranty provisions by interpreting the
description of the automobile to require the seller to furnish a moving
vehicle in operating condition.' 3 ' Such a warranty by description
could not be disclaimed."
It has been argued that disclaimer clauses that meet the technical
requirements of section 2-316 should not be subject to any scrutiny
under the unconscionability doctrine,'33 but this argument conflicts with
the statute, the Comments, and the cases. According to the Official
Comment, the purpose of section 2-316 is "to protect a buyer from
unexpected or unbargained language of disclaimer . .. ,, .. ' An
analogous problem is presented by the good-faith requirement of section
1-203, which is applicable to all conduct subject to the Code. Under
this good-faith requirement, a Court should not ignore the use of de-
ceptive sales practices to procure even a technically perfect disclaimer
under section 2-316. Similarly, since article 2 does not limit the ap-
plicability of the unconscionability doctrine, it could be used to defeat
disclaimer clauses where surprise or oppression surrounded the forma-
tion of the contract. 35 Since section 2-316 deals only with the form
of the final written contract, it cannot isolate either bad faith or un-
conscionable conduct in the contract formation process. The form of
the agreement reflects only a small aspect of the seller's conduct, and
a section with such a narrow focus should not preempt a doctrine that
considers all aspects of the seller's conduct. The courts have clearly
seen this distinction, and although the disclaimer clauses presented for
review have not met the technical requirements of the Code, their
130 Karsales Ltd. v. Wallis, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936 (C.A.).
131 UCC §2-313 (1) (b).
32 UCC § 2-316(1).
133 "It appears to be a matter of common assumption that section 2-302 is appli-
cable to warranty disclaimers. I find this, frankly, incredible." Leff, supra note 3,
at 523.
134 UCC § 2-316, Comment 1 (emphasis added). These are the same two types
of situations dealt with by the unconscionability doctrine.
135 One typical example is the consumer who does not read English, and who
cannot obtain the assistance of a neutral party to read the contract to him. Cf.
Frostifresh v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Nassau County Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd on issue of damages, 54 Misc.2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct 1967).
If the seller represents to this consumer that he is buying a car "which will go," with-
out calling his attention to the disclaimer and its full import, there would seem to be
an impairment of the fundamental terms of the contract, no matter how conspicuous
or correctly drafted the disclaimer and merger clauses of the form. A less obvious
case, but one that is probably within the ambit of the earlier analysis, involves the
inconspicuous use of the words "as is." Although this seems to protect the seller
completely under §2-312(3), it is unlikely to do so in a context in which the buyer
would not understand the words to mean that all warranties are disclaimed. It
should also be noted that this avenue of construction has been deliberately and
expressly closed in the unconscionability sections of the U3C. U3C §§ 5.108(3),
6.111(4).
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language indicates that better technical wording of overreaching or
hidden clauses would not succeed. 136
B. Oppressive Terms-Unreasonable
The decisions illustrate the concept of "manifest unreasonableness."
This concept has many facets, but it is primarily based upon a balancing
of interests rather than a comparison of different terms within the
contract. The court must weigh the legitimate interests of the drafting
party against identifiable public policies that the terms may contravene.
Manifestly unreasonable terms range through a continuum from those
whose paramount defect is lack of support by legitimate interests of
the drafting party ("commercially unjustified"), to those whose defect
is that they are contrary to a public interest recognized by the courts
("void as against public policy"). Between these two poles there is
an infinite number of permutations containing various degrees of both
types of defects.
Perhaps the best illustration of the commercially unjustified con-
tract term is the overdrafted clause, which automatically claims special
privileges for the drafting party in all situations, whether the privileges
are relevant to the contract or not, and whether or not they are sup-
ported by any legitimate interest of the drafting party. In short, the
draftsman has not bothered to analyze his client's needs, substituting
overkill. For example, a lender can claim the right to open and dispose
of all the borrower's mail, but such a clause does not reflect any legiti-
mate relationship between the loan agreement and the borrower's non-
business mail,'37 and has been labelled unconscionable if the lender
attempts to apply it to personal mail.138
A more serious example is presented by the combination of clauses
that permits the lender to refuse future loans and prohibits the bor-
136
In the opinion of a majority of the court, the provisions on the front of the
purchase order did not make adequate reference to the provisions on the back
of the order to draw attention to the latter. Hence the provisions on the
back of the order cannot be said to be conspicuous although printed in an
adequate size and style of type. The disclaimer was not effective.
Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 226 N.E.2d 228, 232 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1967). See also
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960);
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 447-48, 240 A.2d 195, 198-99
(1968).
137 A loan agreement is admittedly outside article 2, but has been held subject
to the more general equitable doctrine of unconscionability. It re Elkins-Dell Mfg.
Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 873 (E.D.Pa. 1966).
138 In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1021, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1965),
remanded for further hearing, 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966). The court did not
attempt to explain what business mail of a corporation would not concern the loan
agreement. The District Court remanded. See note 139 infra.
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rower from seeking loans elsewhere, thus potentially permitting the
financial strangulation of the borrower.139 Absent unusual facts, the
lender has no legitimate interest in prohibiting loans based on collateral
it has refused to accept. The creditor can legitimately claim only a
right of first refusal on new discretionary loans. Any assertion of
greater rights, not based on legitimate interests of the drafting party,
seems commercially unjustified, and therefore subject to the uncon-
scionability doctrine.'
Terms that contravene some identified public policy may also be
manifestly unreasonable. Courts do not need section 2-302 to void
such contracts and clauses, but the unconscionability doctrine furnishes
a useful format for decision, and provides extreme flexibility in the
remedies available. Regardless of the drafting party's interest in
the contract term, the term is unreasonable if the public's interest is
found to be paramount. For example, a referral sale contract has
been held to be a fraud, a lottery, and unconscionable as against public
policy. 4' Clauses waiving defenses against an assignee have been
struck down as contrary to specific public policies and unconscionable.'4
It is doubtful that the unconscionability concept either helped or
139 If this had been the only overreaching term, a more appropriate response by
the court would have been to reform the prohibition clause to effect only a right of
first refusal coincident with the lender's interests. However, the agreement allowed
the lender: (1) to dispose of all of borrower's mail; (2) to refuse to make future
loans while prohibiting borrower from borrowing elsewhere; (3) to unilaterally
change the terms of the agreement and (4) to collect unearned interest if the lender
deemed itself insecure. This combination of clauses impelled the bankruptcy court to
strike down the entire agreement as too one-sided. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 2
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1021, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1965). Reformation of all of the harsh terms
would have been too difficult and too late.
The bankruptcy court's determination was remanded for further hearings on the
commercial setting, primarily to determine whether the lender had ever enforced any of
his disproportionate rights. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 873-74
(E.D. Pa. 1966). Unless the rights had been asserted, the contract would not have
created oppressive results, even though its appearance was harsh. The District Court
therefore limited the definition of "oppression" to effecting oppressive results, and
ignored the it terrorenm use of such clauses. For a lengthier discusison of the
district court's opinion, including other reasons given for the remand, see Comment,
Bankruptcy: Equitable Subordination of Unconscionable Claims, 40 S. CAL. L. REV.
165 (1967). Regarding the procedural abuses in the case, see text accompanying
note 115 supra.
140 The effect of these clauses is almost identical to the effect produced, and struck
down, in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948). Both Campbell
and Elkins-Dell probably resulted from the sloppy drafting caused by a failure to
examine a client's needs, rather than from any malice or attempted duress. See
1954 Hearings 177.
'41 State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
142The waiver of defense clause was held void as contrary to 3 identified public
policies: (1) the requisites of negotiability and preservation of defenses against trans-
ferors who are not holders in due course established by the legislature in the Negotiable
Instruments Law; (2) the spirit of legislative preservation of defenses against
an assignor in a suit by the assignee prior to notification of the assignment; and (3)
the state's continued policy of protecting conditional vendees against imposition by
conditional vendors and installment sellers. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 124, 232 A.2d
405, 417-18 (1967).
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hindered the courts' analyses of these problems; 143 the same results
have been reached by other courts without using it.144
The unconscionability concept may, however, have an effect in less
extreme situations. Where the clause is not prohibited by public policy,
but is disfavored, the court may examine the facts surrounding the
formation of contract for procedural abuse. If such abuse is found, the
court may then void the clause in the specific case, using a sliding scale
to judge the combined effect of the procedural and substantive abuses.
A clause waiving the right to a jury trial has been voided where the
court found significant procedural abuses and identified a strong public
policy favoring the privilege of jury trials. 45 Although a similar result
has been reached in another case without using unconscionability, the
court was required to analyze the substantive and procedural abuses sep-
arately, and hold as alternative grounds that either would be sufficient
to void the term.' 46  The unconscionability doctrine furnishes a more
subtle analytical tool.
The concept of unconscionability as a balancing of interests will
be most useful in analyzing a term supported by a slight interest of the
drafting party that is disfavored, but not prohibited, by a public in-
terest. For example, absent further explanation, a submission-to-
jurisdiction clause naming a specific court in a state unrelated to the
contract could be considered commercially unjustified because un-
supported by any legitimate interest. The drafting party had no
legitimate interest in requiring disputes to be submitted to the courts of
Nassau County, New York, when they arose from a contract made in
Massachusetts between Massachusetts resident buyers and a seller
doing business in Massachusetts and not authorized to do business in
New York.'47 However, since the seller's parent company was a New
143 Each court was very careful to identify the precise public policy it found
violated. See cases cited in notes 147-48 infra. It is obvious that this technique can
be abused by a less conscientious court that may hold some term unconscionable and
against public policy without identifying the public interest protected. However, the
technique is available, and certainly has been used, without reliance on the uncon-
scionability device.
'44 Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 155, 148 N.E.2d 385, 389 (1958);
see Dearborn Motors Credit Corp. v. Neel, 184 Kan. 437, 439, 337 P.2d 992, 1002
(1959); San Francisco Sec. Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220
P. 229 (1923). For discussion of the public policy rationale, see Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d
8, 167-72 (1955).
145 David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1145, 1147,
1149-50 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968). In discussing this aspect of the case, the court found
oppression in the use of a form contract by a quasi-public institution as well as surprise
through the use of documents that did not connote that a contract was being executed.
146 Frankini v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 31 Cal. App. 2d.
666, 88 P.2d 790 (1939).
147 Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Langlois, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967) ; Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Crace, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
The original actions were dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, since
neither party was a resident of New York and New York had no interest in the litiga-
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York corporation, it might have claimed an interest in centralizing its
litigation. An interest-balancing analysis could find such claims
counterbalanced by an illegitimate effect, the undue difficulty for the
buyer to sue or to defend actions relating to the contract. If the sub-
sidiary corporations held themselves out as independent businesses,
doing business within a limited area and with limited liability, the
parent corporation's interest in ease of litigation would be subservient,
depriving the clause of its asserted commercial justification. 4 '
Such interest-balancing is also useful where the public policy is
less certain and the absence of legitimate interest on the part of the
drafting party is less clear. An example is a provision for cross-
collateral in a consolidation agreement that releases no prior purchases
until all subsequent obligations are satisfied. 149  It could be argued that
there is no public policy against such terms, at least in a state having
no applicable provision in a retail installment sales act."' But such an
argument would have to ignore the large number of retail installment
sales acts, each of which prohibits cross-collateral clauses that extend
the payment periods of prior purchases.' 51 These widespread legis-
lative prohibitions may indicate that such clauses are contrary to
recognized business standards, and provide the foundation for ascer-
taining the public interests to be protected.' 52
tion. A contract was then assigned to seller's parent company, a New York corpora-
tion, which brought suit in its own name against the buyers. The court dismissed
the action holding the submission-to-jurisdiction clause unconscionable. Paragon
Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
148 The court did not seem to find that the defendants had been surprised by the
clause, but the fact that it was a printed clause in a form contract was sufficient to
satisfy the procedural requirements of oppression, or non-bargaining. Even though
the procedures used were not unduly oppressive, they were sufficient to bring a sub-
stantively unjustified clause within the ambit of the unconscionability doctrine.
149 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co,, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
150 See Leff, supra note 3, at 544-45.
151 It has been suggested that the security arrangement permitting all of Mrs.
William's prior purchases to be repossessed upon default at any time, even though
the payment period for the prior purchases has been extended, was not patently
unconscionable because provisions allowing cross-collateral clauses appear in the
various state retail installment sales acts. Leff, supra note 3, at 554-55. This assertion
fails to recognize that there are three basic kinds of cross-collateral clauses. (1) The
payments may be pro-rated to keep a balance owing on all prior purchases until the
final payment is made on the last purchase. Such an arrangement extends the dura-
tion of the payments on the first purchase. (2) The first consolidated payments may
be applied first to complete the payment on prior purchases. Such an arrangement
accelerates payments on the first purchases. (3) The payments may be pro-rated to
pay off all the purchases in the order they were made. Under such an arrangement,
subsequent purchases do not affect the payment schedule of prior contracts. Walker-
Thomas involved the first type of arrangement. The retail installment sales acts,
however, invariably adopt either the second or the third alternatives, or a combination
of them. The acts do not permit the perpetual extension of prior purchase payment
periods by subsequent purchase contracts. See the partial enumeration of consolida-
tion provisions in B. CURRAN, TRENDs ix CoNsumR CREIwr LEGIsLATIoN 107 n.206
(1965).
152 The "business practices" standard was expressly adopted in Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The use of such
legislation as a basis for creating public policies is discussed in note 83 mupra.
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On the other hand, a seller can argue that the additional collateral
is necessary protection in a case where repayment is especially insecure.
If he reserves use of such clauses for improvident loans, the argument
seems based on an assertion of a clearly-perceived interest of the seller.
However, if the clause appears on a contract form imposed on all
buyers, the seller's legitimate interest in the additional security is open
to question. At least the seller has not considered whether such an
interest existed in the particular sale, and a balancing approach could
find the public interest worthy of protection.15 3
With this approach, courts may now expressly examine problems
that were previously felt to be outside their province. For example, the
public interest in the preservation of good-faith dealings between parties
may be recognized expressly. Since determinations of good faith will
most often involve the conduct of the parties, rather than the terms of
a contract, the unconscionability doctrine stated in the Code is not pre-
cisely applicable." However, there are at least two good-faith prob-
lems that involve reliance upon contract clauses. Insecurity clauses may
be asserted only in good faith, 55 and may not avoid an agreement to
waive a default.'56 Instant termination clauses have caused great
difficulties for courts, 5 ' although not for legislatures,15 and the un-
conscionability doctrine will now permit courts to influence the use
of such clauses, no matter how broadly drafted.5 9
153 This issue was not determined in Williams, but the case was remanded for a
hearing on the unconscionability issue.
'54See Imperial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 38 Misc.2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269
(Kings County Ct 1963); U3C § 6.111; Farnsworth, Good Faith Performaice and
Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform CommInercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
666 (1963).
155 UCC § 1-208.
156 Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 15 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1967).
157 See, e.g., Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675
(2d Cir. 1940) ; Riedly v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 82 F. Supp. 8 (W.D. Ky. 1949) ;
Peeler v. Tarola Motor Car Co., 170 Ore. 600, 134 P.2d 105 (1943). But cf. Kuhl
Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955). See also Note,
63 H.Av. L. REv. 1010, 1014 (1950).
358 UCC §§ 1-102, 2-309; Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1221-25 (1964).
159 Cf. Sinkhoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc.2d 446, 273
N.Y.S2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966), denying a hearing on the asserted unconscionability
of an immediate termination clause in a dealership contract. The court noted that a
hearing would have been necessary if any grounds for unconscionability had been
presented, and apparently found that none were because the contract was "mutually
beneficial." The court's criterion seems irrelevant, because the general benefits avail-
able through the contract are not necessarily related to the specific abuses possible
under a particular clause. After all, Claus Henningsen certainly benefited from his
contract to purchase a new Plymouth until it went off the road. A more important
factor in the Sinkhoff decision is that the hearing was denied on a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, rather than before final judgment
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C. Unfairly Surprising Terms
Many of the cases discussed above can be analyzed in the terms
propounded by Llewellyn concerning form contracts: printed clauses
may neither impair the dickered terms nor be unreasonable or unfair." °
Such a definition conforms to the analytical structure previously de-
rived for oppression cases. However, it was suggested that a different
standard might be involved in unfair surprise cases-a standard de-
pendent upon the non-drafting party's expectations.
Although many cases using the unconscionability concept have
been decided on policy grounds,' 6 ' some have emphasized the violation
of the non-drafting party's expectations. A referral sale contract may
be struck down if the buyer was led by deceptive sales practices to
believe that he was only enrolling in an advertising scheme, not incur-
ring an obligation.'O The seller created expectations contrary to the
terms of the contract, and where the two conflict, the deliberately
created expectations will be enforced.
In the more difficult case, the drafting party has not deliberately
created any contrary expectations, but the contract term is both un-
expected and obscurely worded, minimized, or hidden in masses of
fine print. In this situation the courts have emphasized the lack of
understanding on the part of the non-drafting party, and his lack of
opportunity to understand the terms, finding an absence of both consent
and any objective manifestation of consent to the terms.' 63 Such an
analysis should conclude that the non-understood, hidden terms cannot
be binding without a credible manifestation of assent by the non-
drafting party,6 4 and therefore cannot be considered terms of the
160 See text accompanying notes 27-46 supra. It should be noted that all the
unconscionability cases to date have involved form contracts.
3161 At least one case, which found both surprise and oppression as possible pro-
cedural abuses, framed its instructions on remand to the trial court in terms of policy
considerations, and ignored the violation of the non-drafting party's expectations as a
standard. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
See also Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) ; Paragon Homes, Inc. v.
Carter, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1968).
16 State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup.
Ct. 1967).
103
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without knowledge of its terms
might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.
But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice signs
a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms,
it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his
consent, was ever given to all the terms.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see
David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1145, 1149 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1968).
164 See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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contract. But the parties have entered into a contract, and terms
settling various possible disputes are needed. If the boilerplate terms
are not usable, the traditional approach has been to revert to the
common law rules of contracts, or to "fill in the gaps" by imposing the
statutory rules of the UCC on the parties.'
Such an approach may be sound for contracts that are silent on
disputed points, but this is not the situation presented by the form
contract with clauses hidden in the boilerplate. The non-drafting party
has signed a form covered with printing drafted by another. He has
thereby assented to some structuring of the transaction by the drafting
party, and to some allocation of risks in that party's favor. He has
not, however, assented to the imposition of terms that change other
contractual relationships between the parties. 6" Nor has he neces-
sarily assented to waive any of his major rights, such as those regarding
the quality of the goods or his remedies for breach of contract 6"T He
is entitled to expect that reasonable efforts will be made to bring to
his attention any major changes in the normal burdens of the trans-
action. If no such efforts are made, the court should inquire into his
reasonable expectations concerning substantive terms.
D. Price Disparity
Although the courts have not explicitly used unexpectedness as a
criterion for harsh terms, they have adopted price disparity as such a
criterion, but only in cases presenting factors in addition to the price
disparity. The courts may have stated the issue as solely dependent
upon the price disparity, but their discussion of other facts in most of
the cases indicates that this is an oversimplification. Two cases have
involved referral sales contracts and flagrant deceptive sales practices, 6"
185 UCC § 2-207(3) ; Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 306 N.Y.
288, 118 N.E.2d 104 (1954); Klar v. H & N Parsel Room, Inc., 270 App. Div. 538,
61 N.Y.S.2d 285, aff'd, 296 N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E2d 912 (1947) ; Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw,
374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
186 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(extension of payment period on prior purchase contracts).
167 Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) (waiver of defenses against
assignee) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69 (1960)
(disclaimer of warranty); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super 441,
240 A2d 195 (1968) (disclaimer of warranty); Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 4
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (waiver of right to use convenient
court); David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1145 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1968) (waiver of right to jury trial).
168 State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup.
Ct. 1967) ; Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd on issue of damages, 52 Misc.2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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and the contracts could have been held unconscionable on these grounds
alone.'69 One decision expressly considered the abuses arising out of
the contract formation process in its determination of unconscion-
ability. 70  However, the courts each placed greater emphasis on the
price disparity than on the other factors present.
In so doing, they purported to follow the leading case of American
Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver." Although it is possible to
analyze MacIver as based upon other aspects of the contract, the find-
ing of unconscionability seems related primarily to the price disparity.'
Subsequent cases have read MacIver as authority for the proposition
that price disparity alone is sufficient to support a finding of uncon-
scionability.'73
The price charged in one case consisted of a cash price incor-
porating at least a reasonable profit, plus a large (28%), hidden time-
price differential, plus the maximum allowable interest charges.'74 The
decision seems analogous to cases in other jurisdictions holding that
the time-price doctrine may not be used to subvert laws regulating
169 See text accompanying notes 141 & 162 supra. The contracts in Lefkowitz were
voided for fraud, illegality and unconscionability; those in Frostifresh were not
voided and were attacked only on unconscionability grounds. The court was unable
to consider fraud because it had not been pleaded, but the court could have considered
illegality (lottery), and thereby voided the contract, and did not do so. Therefore, the
seller was actually aided by the court's use of unconscionability because he was
allowed to recover the value of the merchandise.
170 State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303,
321 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
171105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
172 There are at least 2 ways to interpret the opinion. One approach focuses
on the fact that the only element of unconscionability discussed by the court is the
price differential. Under this approach, the court holds that a sufficiently extreme
differential is unconscionable. A second approach focuses on the fact that there was
also no disclosure of interest rates. Even though this fact is not relied on in the
discussion of the unconscionability issue, nondisclosure is part of the total situation.
Under this approach, the decision is narrower, holding only that nondisclosure com-
bined with a large price differential can be considered unconscionable. The large
price differential can be regarded as only one form of "harsh term," and perhaps must
be analyzed in terms of the commercial necessity or expectations of the non-drafting
party. One major problem with the second approach is that the New Hampshire
court did not analyze the problem in terms of either "unfair surprise" or "oppression."
Thus relating its analysis to the Code's Comments in any meaningful sense is difficult.
However, a range of possible rationales must be expected in any decision that first
applies a new concept. No analytical structure is available to the court for surveying
the new ground. For further discussion of this point, see the text at note 182 infra.
See also Comment, 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 367, 369-71 (1968).
173 State e retl. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup.
Ct. 1967) ; Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 25, 274 N.Y.S,2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd on issue of damages, 54 Misc2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967) ;
Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc2d 620, 279 N.Y.S2d 391 (Civ. Ct. 1967).
174 Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966),
rev'd on issue of damages, 54 Misc2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967) ; Com-
ment, 20 MAiNE L. REv. 159, 163-67 (1968).
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maximum interest charges1 75 The prices charged in another case
consisted of a cash price at least double the retail market value, plus
interest charges greater than those allowed by statute." 6 Even the
laesio enormis doctrine in its strictest sense was satisfied by such a
2 to 1 disparity between price and value, 177 and a similar standard has
been adopted apparently by many equity courts as a criterion for un-
conscionability 
7 8
The leading case presents greater difficulties of analysis. The
court analyzed the total price as consisting of "the value of the goods
and services," the salesman's commission, and interest, and found the
total price to be more than double the "value of the goods and
services." 179  While the original analysis of the price term may cause
economists to blush or sputter,180 the rationale fits into the traditional
pattern that a 2 to 1 price-value ratio is too great. Thus the problem
is created, not by the legal theory advanced, but by the court's under-
standing of the economic theories involved.
A price-disparity doctrine is compatible with the conceptually de-
rived analytical structure if unconscionability comprises price disparity
accompanied by other inequitable incidents.'' Unquestionably, in the
two referral sale cases, other factors influenced the court. Maclver
also contained inequitable incidents, including the nondisclosure of
either the amount or rate of interest and the executory nature of the
175Although the New York law, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §411(1) (McKinney
1962), permits sale of accounts at any mutually agreeable price, the legislature could
not have intended to permit this discount to be added to the cash sale price in addition
to the maximum allowable interest charges in those situations where the seller knows
at the time of the sale that he can discount the contract immediately. Some courts have
considered such a scheme "but a cloak for usury." See Hare v. General Contract
Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952) ; Littlefield, Parties and Trans-
actions Covered by Conmoner-Credit Legislation, 8 B.C. IND. & Cor. L. REv. 463
(1967).
176 State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup.
Ct. 1967); Comment, 20 MAINE L. REv. 159, 168-70 (1968).
177 Dawson, supra note 13, 11 TUL. L. Ray. at 364. The German Civil Code
today repudiates the strict mathematical formulation, and declares a contract void
when the disproportion is obvious. BGB § 138 (C. H. Beck 1966).
178 Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. La Chance, 113 Me. 550, 95 A. 223, (1915);
Linsell v. Halicki, 240 Mich. 483, 215 N.W. 315 (1927) ($2200 paid to realize a profit
of $4300) ; Teacher's Retirement Fund Assn. v. Pirie, 150 Ore. 435, 46 P.2d 105
(1935) ($15,000 paid for land valued at $20,000-$26,000) ; Serena v. Ruben, 146 Kan.
603, 72 P.2d 995 (1937) ($200 paid for lease valued at $520); Downing v. State, 9
Wash.2d 685, 115 P.2d 972 (1941) ($600 paid for right-of-way valued at $850-$3000).
179 American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.d
886 (1964).
180 See, e.g., Comment, 20 MAINE L. RLv. 159, 159-63 (1968).
181 See authorities cited in notes 21, 94-98 sumpra. The U3C implicitly adopts
this position by allowing courts to "consider" "gross" price disparity in determining
unconscionability, without, however, expressly stating that such disparity alone is
sufficient to establish it. U3C § 6.111(3) (c).
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contract. The nondisclosure indicated deception and the possibility
that the consumer did not appreciate the full extent of his contractual
obligation. The executory nature of the contract facilitated its can-
cellation on equitable grounds in a manner analogous to the rescission
of executory contracts for a unilateral mistake." 3 In fact, the uni-
lateral mistake cases allowing rescission usually include a finding that
the contract would have been "unconscionable."
The cases provide alternative analytical structures in the price
disparity area. The courts have phrased their opinions in terms of a
gross disparity between price and value, usually at least 2 to 1. How-
ever, the fact situations have involved other inequitable factors, gen-
erally involving deception of the non-drafting party. A requirement
of additional factors would conform more closely to the civil-law and
pre-Code unconscionability doctrines, and therefore it may be war-
ranted. Under such a requirement, price disparity would be relied on
sparingly,' and its use would be influenced by the remedy sought.
Cancellation of the contract would be more easily obtainable on this
ground than damages, and cancellation would be facilitated if the con-
tract were still executory. 84
If the doctrine is not limited by a requirement of factors in addi-
tion to price disparity, the case law gloss has added a new feature to
the conceptually derived analytical structure. An expansion of the
doctrine from prior case law and the Official Comments should not be
surprising, nor should it be rejected merely because it is new. It
should be judged on its own merits on a case-by-case basis. The
courts would be unwise to undertake price regulation in close cases,
but extreme disparity does not present the same problems. In any
event, few transactions will contain extreme price disparity without
other inequitable incidents,8 5 so the analytical problem may not arise
in practice.
1S2 Moffet, Hodgins & Clarke Co. v. City of Rochester, 178 U.S. 373, 385, 387
(1900); Franklin Nat. Bank v. Austin, 99 N.H. 59, 104 A.2d 742 (1954); Geremia
v. Boyarsky, 107 Conn. 387, 140 A. 749 (1928) ; Confrancesco Const. Co. v. Superior
Components, Inc., 52 Tenn. App. 88, 371 S.W. 2d 821 (1963); Annot., 59 A.L.R.
809 (1929).
183 See authorities and discussion in note 45 s=pra.
84 See American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A2d
886 (1964). Compare the influence of the remedy sought on the availability of recovery
through torts doctrine. See Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEX. L.
REv. 1 (1953).
,85 The best example of a contract involving extreme price disparity without
other inequitable incidents or any procedural abuses is the government procurement
contract in which the price charged the government is approximately 10 times the
catalog price of the seller. See, e.g., 113 Cong. Rec. 10,616-17 (daily ed. Aug. 16,
1967) (remarks of Representative Pike); 113 Cong. Rec. 12,253 (daily ed. Aug. 25,
1967) (remarks of Senator Byrd).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The concept of unconscionability is not impossibly vague. It
normally requires the presence of both substantive and procedural
abuses, and a sliding-scale approach may be used when one type of
abuse is especially great.
The first type of procedural abuse is "surprise," a concept that
seems to create no analytical problems. The other is "oppression,"
which does create problems because of its seeming conflict with "free-
dom of contract." "Oppression" connotes that non-bargaining over
terms may be abusive, even though the non-drafting party has mani-
fested a choice to enter into the contract. It implies that "freedom of
contract" includes the ability to codetermine terms, and that if this
ability is denied, the resulting unilaterally determined terms will be
subject to special scrutiny. Since the ability to codetermine terms is
denied the consumer in adhesion contracts, special scrutiny has been
especially prevalent there.
The substantive abuses also fall into separate identifiable forms.
One form of abuse is the term which violates the reasonable expecta-
tions of the non-drafting party. It may arise when the drafting party
deliberately creates expectations contrary to the contract terms, or when
an important contract clause, such as one waiving rights relating to
the quality of the goods or remedies for breach, is obscurely worded,
hidden or minimized. In effect, the standard forbidding unexpected
terms replaces the concept that a man is bound by all that he signs with
the concept that either contracts of adhesion (law written by the draft-
ing party) must divide the risks between the parties fairly or the non-
drafting party must be adequately warned of any one-sided apportion-
ment. This development is similar to the courts' earlier replacement
of caveat emptor with implied warranties.
However, not all one-sided clauses can be immunized from attack
merely because the non-drafting party has been warned of the harsh-
ness of the terms. A second form of substantive abuse is the printed
clause that alters or impairs the dickered terms. Courts no longer
allow such clauses to contradict basic expectations created by the
bargaining process, regardless of the form of the later memorandum.
This facet of the unconscionability doctrine is analogous both to the
English "fundamental breach" cases and to the UCC provisions pro-
hibiting the disclaimer of express warranties. The primary target of
the concept is the warranty disclaimer or limitation of remedy.
Price disparity has also been recognized as one form of sub-
stantive abuse. The courts have generally not relied upon this abuse
unless they have found a disparity of 2 to 1 between price and "value,"
[Voi.117:931
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as they define value. This seems a conservative approach, except that
economists would disagree with some of the methods of evaluation used.
To date the courts have also limited the use of this facet of the un-
conscionability doctrine to cases involving other inequitable features in
addition to price disparity.
The unconscionability doctrine has been used most frequently to
balance the interests of the public and the drafting party. This facet
of the doctrine is related to the cases that have voided contract terms
for being "contrary to public policy," except that it furnishes a more
subtle analytical tool. The court is able to consider not only whether
the term under attack contravenes a public interest, but also whether
it protects any legitimate interest of the drafting party. In difficult
cases, the methods of contract formation may also be considered. Under
such an approach, the courts can indicate those policies that have
actually influenced their analysis of the problem, rather than use the
prior surreptitious methods. Further, the courts have so indicated in
the majority of cases decided to date,186 even when remanding for
further hearing because of an incomplete record.
187
The articulation of policies increases the predictability of result
for the draftsman, because he will be advised of the abuses the courts
find unacceptable and can avoid them. It also will aid in the adjudi-
cation of litigated cases, because the advocate can argue to the problems
which actually concern the courts, rather than strike postures about
irrelevant technicalities. However, indicating the policies involved in
prior cases cannot provide complete predictability of result in the
future, nor should it be expected to. As in other areas of the law, public
policies may be derived from many sources: prior cases, local and
foreign state statutes, and notions of good faith and fair dealing. The
variety and scope of the policies that may be asserted are not limited,
but are as great as the ability of the draftsman to create unreasonable
clauses. Thus, the unconscionability doctrine will require the drafts-
man to develop and follow his own sense of fairness.
188 See, e.g., In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; Unico
v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); State ex- rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc.,
52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1967) ; David v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1145 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968). See also Paragon Homes,
Inc. v. Carter, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1968).
187h; re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Unico v.
Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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